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Throwing the baby out with the bath water? The impact of Coalition 
reforms on identifying sub-national transport priorities in England 
Ian Stafford, Cardiff University & Sarah Ayres, Bristol University 
 
Abstract  
The coalition government has set out plans to dismantle the regional tier and return 
powers to localities and Whitehall departments. These changes will have significant 
implications for the way in which transport policy is formulated and delivered in 
England. When in power, New Labour introduced a range of measures to strengthen 
governance arrangements for promoting a more joined-up and decentralised approach 
to transport policy, including Regional Funding Allocations (RFAs). This paper 
examines the opportunities and limitations of the RFA process and considers the 
consequences of removing these regional structures for transport policy in England.  
We conclude that important progress made in recent years to develop effective 
arrangements for identifying transport priorities at the sub-national tier could be 
derailed by the Coalition’s intention to remove regional governance structures in their 
entirety. 
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Introduction 
 
The introduction of devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and an 
elected Mayor in London have fundamentally transformed territorial governance in 
the UK. However, Labour’s approach in England, outside of London, centered on a 
limited form of administrative decentralisation focused primarily on regions and 
within policy and fiscal frameworks defined by the Centre (Jeffery 2006; Hazell, 
2006; Pearce, 2008). Following the 2010 UK general election, the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition Government pursued a clear ‘post-regionalist’ agenda 
which centred on a rescaling of governance within England and ‘a fundamental shift 
of power from Westminster’ to local councils, communities, neighbourhoods and 
individuals (HM Government, 2010a: 11). The Coalition’s commitment to ‘localism, 
localism, localism’ has driven the wide scale dismantling of the regional 
administrative tier in England and core functions have been devolved to local 
authorities or returned to Whitehall departments (Pickles, 2010a). However, the extent 
to which the Coalition’s decentralisation agenda has been driven by a genuine 
commitment to localism is open to question. The ‘localism’ agenda, for example, has 
been characterised as a ‘subterfuge for small staters’ (Walker, 2010: 84) to justify an 
ideologically driven reduction in the role of the state, cuts in government spending 
and a re-centralisation of functions (Mulgan, 2010; Cox, 2010).  
 
Despite the shift from regionalism to localism, aspects of the Coalition’s reform 
agenda can be seen to pursue broadly similar objectives to the previous Labour 
administration in terms of promoting policy integration through enhanced sub-
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national discretion over decision-making. In June 2010, for example, the Coalition 
invited local authorities and business leaders to establish Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) in order to provide strategic leadership around local economic 
priorities and ‘better reflect the natural economic geography of the areas they serve’, 
in marked contrast to the ‘arbitrary’ administrative regions established under Labour 
(HM Government, 2010b: 2). The creation of ‘bottom up’ LEPs was based upon the 
assumption that the regional tier had generated ‘a huge amount of pointless 
bureaucracy’ and that regional strategies were primarily used as a device by Central 
Government ‘to control the actions and choices of all their local authorities’ 
(Conservative Party, 2009: 6). However, due to the Coalition’s ‘hands-off’ approach 
to localism the precise remit of LEPs and what involvement they may have in 
transport policy remains unclear.  
 
Transport policy is acknowledged as an area that has significantly benefited from the 
economies of scale, shared resources and alignment with associated policy areas that a 
coordinated regional or sub-regional approach provided (Town and Country Planning 
Association, 2010; Network Rail, 2010; Centre of Cities, 2010). These benefits have 
been acknowledged in part by the Coalition in elements of its reform agenda. For 
example, the Local Transport White Paper, Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon: 
Making Sustainable Local Transport Happen, published in January 2011, stressed 
that the Coalition expects LEPs to ‘form a view on the strategic transport priorities 
which best support sustainable economic growth in their areas’ and play a key role in 
co-ordinating partnerships between local transport authorities (DfT, 2011: 27). 
However, doubts remain about whether LEPs will have the resources, expertise or 
political clout to pursue this role (Centre for Cities, 2010). Indeed, there are question 
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marks as to whether the Coalition’s plethora of initiatives at the local level and the 
wholesale rejection of regionalism risks throwing the proverbial baby out with the 
bath water. While there appears to be a legitimate rationale for removing some 
elements of the regional architecture, transport policy is an area where regional 
structures have resulted in some noteworthy gains (Marsden and May, 2006).  
 
New Labour introduced a range of initiatives aimed at promoting policy coordination 
at the sub-national level (Pearce and Ayres, 2007). The Review of Sub-national 
Economic Development and Regeneration (SNR), published in July 2007, introduced 
Single Regional Strategies to integrate economic, social and environmental objectives 
at the regional level. In addition, the sub-regional tier was strengthened through the 
creation of Multi-Area Agreements (MAAs) - partnerships of local authorities, set -up 
to agree collective economic development objectives (HM Treasury et al., 2007; 
Fenwick et al., 2009). Regardings sub-national transport planning and delivery, 
perhaps the most influential element of New Labour’s programme were the two 
rounds of Regional Funding Allocations (RFAs), carried out in 2005 and 2008 (HM 
Treasury et al., 2005; 2008). The RFA process was designed to ‘enhance regional 
input into government policy development, showing how such priorities relate to each 
other to form a coherent, credible and strategic vision for improving the economic 
performance of regions; and how these priorities are aligned to resources’ (HM 
Treasury et al., 2005: 3). The RFAs required key local and regional institutions and 
stakeholders to examine integrated priorities linked to major funding streams for 
economic development, housing, transport, and, latterly, skills and to facilitate a more 
coordinated approach to long-term planning and investment.  
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The RFA exercise represented the first opportunity for regional partners to identify 
regional transport priorities linked to long-term funding allocations provided by the 
Department for Transport (DfT) (JMP Consulting, 2006). The process of prioritising 
regional transport projects was perceived by actors at all governance levels as 
representing a departure from the jam-spreading and political horse trading which had 
characterised previous processes involving direct negotiations between DfT and local 
authorities (JMP Consulting, 2006; Faulkner, 2006; Campaign for Better Transport, 
2009). However, following the election of the Coalition Government in May 2010, 
the RFA process was suspended ahead of the autumn Spending Review and DfT 
announced a review of the way funding decisions would be made around the 
prioritisation of transport projects (DfT 2010a, 2010b).  
 
The decentralisation agenda pursued by the former Labour Government and Coalition 
has been driven in part by the assumption that effective sub-national governance 
arrangements can play an important role in promoting more responsive decision-
making and policy delivery (Goodwin et al., 2005). The approaches of the two 
administrations, albeit at different spatial scales, reflect a wider European trend 
characterised by a fundamental ‘rescaling’ of the state (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 
2003). This process of ‘rescaling’ has driven a redistribution of responsibilities across 
multiple levels of governance, both upwards to supranational organisations, notably 
the European Union (EU), and downwards to regional and sub-national territories 
(Hankler and Downs, 2010; Lidström, 2007; Lobao et al., 2009). Changes in 
territorial governance have also been linked to assumptions about the ‘hollowing out’ 
of the state, characterised by a shift from hierarchical systems of government towards 
more complex, networked forms of governance (Rhodes, 1994; Jessop, 1990, 2001). 
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Jones et al. (2005) argue that linked to the process of ‘hollowing out’ at the national 
scale is a process of organisational and institutional ‘filling in’ at other spatial scales, 
notably the regional and sub-regional levels. However, the continued power of 
Whitehall and the highly centralised management of policy and resources within the 
UK has led some to question the extent to which the Labour Government’s regional 
experiment resulted in ‘state rescaling’ of any significance (Holliday, 2000; Cox, 
2009; Cairney, 2009). Similarly the Coalition’s abolition of the regional tier has led to 
the re-centralisation of some functions and questions have been raised regarding the 
level of commitment to localism across Whitehall (Mulgan, 2010; Cox, 2010). 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the potential impact of the transition from 
regionalism to localism for sub-national transport planning and delivery in England. It 
seeks to address two central questions. (i) What lessons can be learned from the RFA 
process in terms of promoting effective decision making procedures for identifying 
sub-national transport priorities in England? (ii) To what extent has the transition 
from regionalism to localism reflected a genuine rescaling of governance 
arrangements to the local level? The paper draws on an analysis of official documents 
and twenty five semi-structured interviews conducted with senior Whitehall and 
regional officials involved in the transport element of the RFA process between July 
2007 and November 2010. Interviewees were asked about the decision-making 
processes introduced for the RFAs, perceptions of regional governance capacity and 
the impact of the Coalition’s reforms for sub-national transport policy. Interviews 
lasted approximately one hour, were conducted under Chatham House Rules, digitally 
recorded, transcribed and manually coded to illicit elicit findings.      
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The paper is divided into three sections. Following this introduction, section one 
examines the evolving policy and institutional context for transport policy at a 
national, regional and local level in England under New Labour. Section two critiques 
the opportunities and limitations afforded by the RFA process for identifying regional 
transport priorities. Section three explores the Coalition’s ‘localism’ reforms and the 
potential impact on sub-national governance arrangements for transport policy in 
England. We conclude by reflecting on the extent to which the transition from 
regionalism to localism potentially undermines the important progress made in 
enhancing sub-national governance arrangements for transport policy in England.  
 
The Governance of Transport Policy under New Labour: The National, Regional 
and Local Dimensions 
 
The Labour Government pursued a significant ‘rescaling’ of transport governance 
structures, leading to a redefinition and reallocation of rights and responsibilities 
between the centre, devolved administrations and local level (Mackinnon and Vigar, 
2008). New Labour’s commitment to decentralisation was reflected in A New Deal for 
Transport (DETR, 1998: 13-14), which stated that different parts of the UK would be 
encouraged ‘to consider their own transport priorities reflecting their different 
transport needs’. Mackinnon and Vigar (2008: 37) argue that this commitment led to 
‘considerable churn in the institutional infrastructure’ and created a complex pattern 
of governance which included national agencies, such as the Highways Agency and 
Network Rail, and a wide range of regional and local policy initiatives (See Figure 1). 
A key criticism of the governance arrangements put forward by the Coalition has been 
that the Labour Government introduced a highly complex but essentially ‘top-down’ 
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approach to local and regional transport and that sweeping away the regional tier will 
provide a more ‘bottom-up’, simplified approach focused primarily on local 
authorities (DfT, 2010b).  
 
Figure 1. Institutional Arrangements for Transport Decision-Making in the English 
regions under the Labour government 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
The role of the regions within transport policy reflected the ‘creeping regionalisation’ 
which characterised the Labour government’s overall approach to incrementally 
building up the functions and resources of regional governance arrangements within 
England (Tomaney and Hetherington, 2004). In 2000, the unelected Regional 
Assemblies were given a key role in preparing regional planning and transport policy 
through Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) (DETR, 2000). However, as Pearce and 
Ayres (2006: 913) note, this process was perceived as simply ‘restating national 
policy or defending local interests, and failing to take sufficient account of other 
regional strategies to deliver sustainable development’. In response to these criticisms, 
the Labour government introduced statutory Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS), which 
encompassed Regional Transport Strategies (RTS), to provide the strategic framework 
for regions for a fifteen to twenty year period and the overarching vision for Local 
Development Frameworks (LDFs), Local Transport Plans (LTPs) and other regional 
or local programmes (Vigar and Stead, 2003). In addition to strengthening regional 
decision-making capacity, collaboration and policy coordination horizontally between 
local authorities and stakeholders within regions and across policy areas, the Labour 
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government also sought to enhance collaboration vertically between the regions and 
Whitehall departments via the RFA process (HMT et al., 2005; 2008).  
 
The RFA process was part of a range of measures driven forward by the Devolving 
Decision Making Review announced as part of the 2003 Budget (HMT et al., 2004). 
In the two rounds of RFAs, completed in January 2006 and February 2009 
respectively, regions were invited to jointly prepare advice to ministers on spending 
priorities in the immediate spending review period. In addition, they provided 
indicative planning assumptions for future planned investment in the areas of 
transport, housing and economic development (HMT et al., 2005; 2008). The total 
funding included in the exercise amounted to £7.6bn in 2009/10 (economic 
development £2.2bn, housing £3.3bn, transport £2.1bn). While significant, this 
represented just 14 per cent of total public expenditure in the three policy areas and 
1.5 per cent of public expenditure in the regions (HM Treasury and National 
Statistics, 2009). 
 
The Government’s guidance stressed that advice needed to be evidence-based, agreed 
within the region, realistic in terms of cost estimates and consistent with existing 
national and regional policy objectives (HMT et al., 2005). In order to facilitate policy 
alignment, the exercise provided regions with an opportunity to vire or transfer 
funding across the policy areas or to defer spending from earlier to later years within 
the programme. Funding for economic development and housing had, however, 
already been decentralised via earlier reforms. As a consequence, the process tended 
to restate existing priorities, leaving minimal scope for manoeuvre. However, it was 
the first time that allocations for transport funding had been identified at the regional 
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level, opening up the possibility of enhanced sub-national discretion. In response, 
Regional Assemblies established a variety of regional transport partnerships to 
facilitate discussions between key transport partners and stakeholders. These 
arrangements focused on formal regional Boards or Forums made-up of Regional 
Assembly members and supported by officer and advisory groups, which drew on 
transport expertise in the regions (see Figure 1). The design and membership of these 
structures differed from region-to-region. For example, the most robust partnerships 
were in the South East and Yorkshire and Humber regions, which were set-up by the 
Government Offices (GOs) prior to the RFA process in order to examine if there was 
a case for more formalised statutory Regional Transport Boards (DfT, 2004). 
 
In terms of transport planning at the local level, the primary functions of local 
authorities under the Labour Government was the delivery of transport schemes and 
the development of Local Transport Plans (LTPs). LTPs set out five year local 
transport strategies and required consultation with local people, businesses, transport 
operators and community groups. Shepherd et al. (2006: 307) noted that ‘the 
establishment of a single process covering the whole of England was itself a major 
challenge’ given the variations between single and two tier local authorities and the 
existence of  Passenger Transport Authorities andor Executives (PTA/Es) in large 
conurbations. The distinction between regional and local funding streams for transport 
became increasingly blurred under New Labour. In the first round of RFAs, for 
example, regions were asked to prioritise schemes within two funding streams (i) 
capital funding projected for major schemes under the LTPs and (ii) major Highways 
Agency schemes, other than on those roads of the greatest strategic national and 
international importance (HMT et al, 2005). However, in the second round of RFAs 
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the entire LTP block grant for the region was included in the process and regions were 
asked to consider the split between Major Schemes, Highways Capital Maintenance 
and the Integrated Transport Blocks (HMT et al., 2008; DfT, 2008).  
 
The inclusion of the LTP block grants was designed to ‘ensure the effective delivery 
of both local strategies and major schemes’ (DfT, 2008: 3). However, only the 
Yorkshire and Humber, South East and South West regions transferred funding 
between the local and regional transport strands (Yorkshire Forward et al., 2009; 
SEEDA and SEERA, 2009; South West England, 2009). The concerns of the other 
regions were reflected in the North West’s advice which argued that there was a lack 
of sufficient evidence to make changes to the balance of funding and that ‘to do so 
without such evidence could adversely affect the ability of local authorities to deliver 
local transport plans’ (NWDA and 4NW, 2009: 14). The blurring of transport policy 
and planning at the local and regional levels was also exacerbated by shifts in the 
Labour government’s wider approach to decentralisation, for example, with the 
increased focus on the sub-regional tier within the SNR (HMT et al., 2007).  
 
Identifying sub-national transport priorities: Lessons from the RFA process  
 
The RFA exercise was underpinned by several key objectives which still have 
resonance within the Coalition’s reforms. Therefore, an examination of the 
opportunities and limitations afforded by the RFAs process provides valuable insights 
into the scope and feasibility of future transport reforms at the sub-national tier. An 
analysis of the Labour Government’s official guidance on RFAs combined with 
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interviews with DfT officials working on RFAs revealed four overarching objectives 
(HMT et al., 2005; 2008): 
 Enhancing regional discretion in identifying realistic investment priorities, 
 Promoting policy coordination across policy areas, 
 Building governance and decision-making capacity within regions, and  
 Improving vertical intergovernmental relations between Whitehall and the 
regions and horizontally within regions.  
Based on a recent comprehensive examination of the RFA process, the following 
discussion explores the extent to which RFAs helped to secure the four objectives 
identified above.  
 
i. Enhancing regional discretion  
 
A desire to enhance regional discretion over transport priorities reflected the Labour 
Government’s broader objectives around decentralisation. A key failure of previous 
attempts, including the Regional Priority Documents in 2001 and Regional Emphasis 
Documents in 2003, was their inability to force regions to abandon so-called ‘wish 
lists’ and make hard decisions around regional priorities and the limited influence that 
they had in Whitehall (Ayres and Pearce, 2005). A Treasury official noted that 
regions still ‘saw themselves as lobbying organisations asking for more money 
without realising the public sector spending constraints that Central Government 
operates within’. The RFA guidance sent a clear message from government that it 
expected regions to move away from the practice of ‘jam-spreading’, which ensured 
all local authorities got their slice of the cake, and instead engage in a ‘grown-up’ 
process of identifying strategic priorities (DfT official). A DfT official explained that 
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the RFAs had forced regions to begin to make trade-offs between proposed schemes 
and therefore hypothetically ‘if they wanted a £300 million scheme it meant that ten 
£30 million schemes wouldn’t be funded’.  
 
During the first round of RFAs, the majority of regions commissioned consultants to 
develop prioritisation methodologies to assess transport schemes against a number of 
criteria, including (i) policy fit with existing regional and national strategies (ii) value 
for money and (iii) deliverability (Faulkner, 2006). In contrast, the decision-making 
process in the second round of RFAs focused primarily on managing slippages and 
cost increases within the existing programme of transport schemes. For example, a 
GO official from the North West pointed out that ‘there had been some significant 
increases in Highways Agency schemes and so the big questions were could we still 
afford those and did we think that they were still the most important things to do?’ 
Although the RFA exercise clearly established mechanisms to enhance regional 
discretion and facilitate prioritisation, a number of factors served to undermine this 
process.   
 
First, the need to secure a regional consensus around transport priorities meant that a 
degree of ‘jam-spreading’ was almost inevitable and ‘many schemes were included 
solely for fear that rejecting them would put delicate agreements in jeopardy’ 
(Campaign for Better Transport, 2009: 3). A local authority official in the North East, 
for example, noted that a couple of schemes were ‘shoved into the programme’ in 
order to secure support from all local authorities. Second, the degree of flexibility in 
the development of RFA transport programmes was constrained by schemes that had 
been inherited from pre-RFA processes and which were ‘politically untenable’ to 
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simply cancel (South East Regional Assembly official). Third, the level of funding 
included within the RFA exercise was relatively low in comparison with the total 
level of expenditure within regions. For example, in 2008-9 the funding streams 
included within the second round of RFAs varied from 15 per cent to 21 per cent of 
the total identifiable expenditure on transport within regions (HMT et al., 2008; HMT 
and National Statistics, 2010). This issue was exacerbated by the so-called ‘whales in 
the pond’ problem facing many regions, whereby very large infrastructure projects 
swallowed large chunks of the RFA budget (South East Regional Assembly transport 
official). Finally, the first round was criticised as being a ‘partial exercise’ as key 
areas of transport policy, such as rail, were not included. However, the exercise 
developed incrementally and, by the second round regions were encouraged to 
consider small-scale rail projects and the distribution of funding across a wider range 
of funding streams (DfT, 2008). 
 
ii. Promoting policy coordination 
 
The Government’s guidance for the second round of RFAs encouraged regions to 
‘develop and deliver a regionally agreed, coherent investment programme which 
aligns aspects of spatial planning, transport, economic development and housing, 
taking account of economic geography’ (HMT et al, 2008: 6). However, in practice 
the ability to coordinate strategic planning and policy objectives across policy areas 
was severely limited. A GO official from the North East explained that the region had 
established a ‘high level coordination group’ to ensure that there was alignment across 
the three elements of their RFA submission. However, the official conceded that the 
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region had adopted an approach which rendered any meaningful attempt to integrate 
redundant, 
 
‘The three streams came up with their recommendations and then the job of 
the coordination group was to stitch it altogether and make it look as if it was 
integrated. But, to be honest the recommendations of the three streams didn't 
change’.  
 
This fairly cosmetic exercise typified what occurred in other regions. In the North 
West, for example, a GO official described the process as ‘three different exercises 
badged under one heading’.  
 
The inability to effectively join-up these distinct policy areas was viewed as a 
consequence of a range of factors. First, the short timescales involved in both rounds 
of RFAs meant that it was difficult to coordinate the contrasting decision-making 
processes introduced in the different policy strands. A GO official from the East 
Midlands noted that ‘the difficulty was that each strand was using a different 
mechanism and methodology to identify priorities and that was being carried out by 
different groups.’ Second, the RFA exercise struggled to overcome the silo mentality 
which characterised policy development. A GO official from the South West 
explained that, 
 
‘In transport all of the decisions about which priorities were going to feature 
within the programme were led by, and primarily only involved, Transport 
Directors [of local authorities]. So you didn’t have the housing people saying 
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“this is what we need in order to deliver the houses”. You didn’t have that 
conversation on a regular basis’. 
 
Third, the influence of national targets and pre-existing funding commitments meant 
that there was little room for manoeuvre across the policy strands (SQW, 2006). A 
GO official in the North West stated that integrating the transport strand with housing 
and economic development was undermined because ‘the housing pot had very little 
discretionary funding…and the money contained within the RDA’s budget was tied 
into the Corporate Plan for the foreseeable future’. Finally, the regions lacked an 
adequate evidence base to underpin integration across the different funding strands 
and overcome entrenched positions or the ‘dialogues of the deaf’ which characterised 
the decision-making process (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004).  
 
The barriers to policy integration were reflected in the failure of any regions to take 
advantage of the option to vire (or transfer resources) across funding streams. A GO 
official in the South West stated that the major obstacle to virement had been that 
‘once there is money on the table people tended to revert to their silos and get quite 
protectionist…there just wasn’t the appetite for it’. Several regions had begun to 
experiment with limited forms of virement through Regional Infrastructure Funds, 
which provided a mechanism for future infrastructure projects by levering in 
resources from the three funding strands (EEDA et al., 2009; SEEDA and SEERA, 
2009; South West England, 2009). However, the support for virement that had 
developed within the regions was quickly rebuffed by participating Whitehall 
departments ‘who were supportive of the principle of virement but did not want to see 
any money coming out of their pot’ (DCLG Official). Nonetheless the RFA exercise 
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forced regions to think seriously about virement and although this was not reflected in 
the final submissions in the first or second rounds, there was a sense that progress had 
been made regards policy coordination.   
 
iii. Building governance and decision-making capacity  
 
RFA guidance stressed that advice should reflect a regionally-agreed view of 
priorities and that these should be underpinned by an evidence-based understanding of 
economic, social and environmental challenges (HMT et al., 2005; HMT et al., 2008). 
The process of developing these priorities was perceived by DfT officials as 
delivering ‘noteworthy efficiency savings’ within the department and regions because 
local transport authorities required approval from Regional Transport Boards. This 
resulted ‘in the removal of unsuitable schemes before the costly and time consuming 
process of appraisal at the Centre’ (DfT official). The regional tier was seen to 
provide a ‘gatekeeper’ function within the decision-making process that prevented 
local transport authorities from ‘spending lots of money working up schemes that had 
no chance of being funded’ (DfT Official).  
 
The exercise also provided the Regional Transport Boards and Partnerships with a 
clear remit to provide political leadership in the prioritisation process and broker a 
regional consensus. Prior to the RFA exercise, regional transport partnerships were 
criticised as ‘talking shops’ which lacked a clear purpose or influence over resources 
(DfT, 2004). However, the RFA’s impact on the perceived value of these structures 
varied across regions. In the South East, for example, a Regional Assembly official 
stated that the statutory Regional Transport Board had demonstrated ‘good 
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legitimacy’ within the region and was generally perceived positively by local 
authorities and stakeholders as ‘a board that questions and seeks to understand issues 
within the region, not just saying that it knows it all’. In marked contrast, the Interim 
Regional Transport Board in the North East was established on a ‘task and finish 
basis’ to carry out the RFA process and then dissolve. As such, a North East 
Assembly official pointed out that the board lacked legitimacy within the region and 
stated that ‘the cynic in me tells me it has all of the legal status of our office tea fund’. 
These contrasting accounts highlight the challenges faced by Regional Transport 
Boards in identifying strategic priorities but without clear democratic and accountable 
structures.  
 
Despite this, RFAs were perceived by Whitehall and regional officials as enhancing 
the quality of the analysis and evidence base that underpinned decision-making. A 
South West Regional Assembly official noted that,  
 
‘It was quite apparent that in the old process, the allocation of resources was 
quite scattered and didn’t fit the fact that there was a limited number of places 
where major growth and change was happening’.  
 
A key factor in securing regional agreement around priorities was the evidence-based 
prioritisation methodologies developed in many regions (Faulkner, 2006). In most 
instances, key personnel working on transport submissions rallied to get different 
stakeholders and partners signed up to the logic underpinning the methodology. Then, 
once all the data had been processed, stakeholders had to agree with the outcomes 
whether they approved or not.  
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However, questions were raised regards the quality of the evidence utilised in the 
RFA exercise and the reliance of regions on scheme promoters to provide estimates 
on timescales and costs (Nichols, 2007; Campaign for Better Transport, 2009). A 
number of schemes included in the first RFA round substantially increased in cost or 
were significantly delayed, leading to underspends in the short term and delays within 
the overall programme. A South East Regional Assembly official explained that 
scheme promoters were either ‘semi-incompetent’ or deliberately overly-optimistic in 
cost estimates in order to get their schemes included in the programme. The evidence 
provided by scheme promoters was often not subject to detailed analysis at the 
regional level due to a combination of a lack of resources and the tight time 
constraints imposed by the RFA timetable, potentially undermining the ability of 
regional actors to manage long-term investment decisions (Faulkner, 2006; Campaign 
for Better Transport, 2009).  
 
iv. Enhancing intergovernmental relations 
 
A key objective of the RFA process was to develop robust and transparent relations 
vertically between Whitehall and the regions and horizontally between actors within 
regions. A DfT official stated that in the previous system local authorities had tended 
to lobby government for schemes which ‘always added up to far more than the 
available budget and then DfT had to prioritise schemes in a fairly opaque way’. This 
highly centralised decision-making process tended to exacerbate tensions between the 
Centre and local authorities. By contrast, the RFA exercise clearly improved the 
quality of information exchange between the regions and the Centre. DfT established 
secondments between the Department and regional bodies and regular working 
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arrangements which included biannual meetings with regions to review the progress 
of the RFA programme. A DfT official explained that these ongoing meetings were 
crucial because ‘scheme costs and profiles are always fluid…so the snapshot of the 
funding profile of the schemes at the time of the advice is immediately out of date and 
shifts.’  
 
Nonetheless, there were accusations that the RFA process had simply moved 
responsibility for tough transport decisions to the regions, whilst the capacity for final 
funding decisions remained firmly in Whitehall (Marshall et al., 2005). For example, 
a North East Regional Assembly official speculated that the RFA exercise was partly 
motivated by cost-cutting through ‘getting schemes out of central budgets’ and 
‘delegating some of the more unpopular political decisions down to a regional level’. 
A North West GO official argued that DfT,  
 
‘never delegated responsibility for programme management, so whilst the 
region did a very good job of keeping tabs on things and chasing progress, the 
actual individual scheme appraisal and monitoring rested, and has always 
rested, with DfT’.  
 
In a bid to promote (horizontal) relations and partnership working, RFA guidance 
emphasised the importance of developing a regional consensus around priorities and 
engaging a wide range of organisations and stakeholders in the decision-making 
process (HMT et al., 2005; HMT et al., 2008). The DfT’s review of the first round 
stated that regions had been ‘remarkably successful in securing broad acceptance of 
their advice’ and a variety of consultation mechanisms had been used (Faulkner, 
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2006: 20). However, these consultation exercises were constrained by the remit of 
RFAs.  A South West Regional Assembly official pointed out that the timetable for 
the first round was ‘quite tight’ and therefore the region ‘needed to move away from 
the full engagement process…to meet the deadlines that had been set’. The official 
went on to argue that this problem was replicated in the second round and led some 
stakeholders to reflect that prioritisation had been ‘imposed rather than worked 
through by general consensus’. This point was reflected in DfT’s own review, which 
stated that stakeholder consultation was ‘possibly more important as a way of 
developing understanding and acceptance of the process and methodology than for 
any substantive contributions towards the thinking’ (Faulkner, 2006: 19). Likewise, 
the Campaign for Better Transport (2009) found that environmental groups felt 
excluded from RFA negotiations. 
 
The opportunities and limitations of the RFA scheme  
 
The experience of the RFA process offers important insights and reflections that 
might inform the Coalition’s reforms of transport policy in England. Overall, the RFA 
process delivered a range of potential benefits for sub-national transport planning and 
delivery. Although the degree of progress was uneven across the four key objectives 
identified above, there was a clear sense that the exercise was an ongoing process and 
that unresolved areas, such as the virement of funding, might have been addressed in 
future RFA rounds that were announced by the Labour Government before their 
departure (HMT, 2010). However, the scope and remit of the exercise was 
constrained from the start and even the best regional strategies and collaborative 
efforts could not overcome the fundamental weaknesses brought about by Whitehall’s 
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reluctance to cede genuine control over to the sub-national tier. The Coalition also 
appears intent on delivering more effective transport planning and delivery through 
decentralising decision making. Nonetheless, if it is to achieve this it will need to 
build upon the positives aspects of previous sub-national transport initiatives and 
learn from past mistakes. The following discussion explores the potential impacts of 
the Coalition’s planned reforms for sub-national transport planning in England.  
 
Coalition reforms for transport planning at the sub-national tier 
 
The Coalition’s ‘post regionalist’ agenda is underpinned by a fundamental critique of 
New Labour’s approach to territorial management within England (Clark and Mather, 
2003; Conservative Party, 2009; Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2010). Regional governance 
arrangements have been criticised as over-bureaucratic, expensive, top-down, 
undemocratic and artificial constructs, which failed to reflect real economic 
geographies and local aspirations (Clark, 2010; Pickles, 2010b; 2010c). Despite this, 
the Coalition recognises that localities will need to ensure economies of scale and 
promote policy cohesion through partnerships that span local authority boundaries 
(DfT, 2011). This was emphasised in the Localism Bill, published in December 2010, 
which provided for a duty on local authorities and other bodies to co-operate with 
each other in order to ‘maximise effective working on sustainable development and 
use of land, in particular in connection with strategic infrastructure’ (HM 
Government, 2010c: 47). The Bill also provided local authorities with the power to 
‘put their collaborative strategic planning work on a statutory footing if they wish to’ 
(DfT, 2011: 28). However, doubts remain about whether new arrangements will be 
able to deliver more effective policy coordination given the continued uncertainty 
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surrounding the remit of future local governance arrangements and the lack of clarity 
over available funding.  
 
LEPs form a central pillar of coalition plans for strengthening governance at a local 
level. They are intended to provide strategic leadership around local economic 
priorities and potentially a range of other policy areas, including planning, housing, 
local transport and infrastructure (HM Government, 2010b). The tight timetable to 
develop LEP submissions set out by the Coalition led to an intense period of 
negotiations between local authorities and business communities and produced a high 
level of diversity across the 62 submissions received by government (HM 
Government, 2010b; SQW, 2010). A North East GO official reflected that the 
experience within the region suggested that although the Coalition ‘was trying to get a 
thousand flowers to bloom…we have ended up with half a dozen roses and lots of 
dandylions, so there is a big weeding process to be done’. This ‘weeding process’ was 
reflected in the White Paper, Local Growth: realising every place’s potential, 
published in October 2010 (BIS, 2010). The White Paper confirmed that 24 LEP 
submissions had been approved but that failed proposals could be revised and 
resubmitted - a further four LEPs were announced in January 2011 (BIS, 2011). 
However, not all commentators are convinced that the emerging governance 
arrangements will have the necessary capacity, powers, funding and geographic 
coverage to fulfil the strategic functions envisaged by the Coalition (SQW, 2010; 
Centre for Cities, 2010; Pugalis, 2010; Johnson and Schmuecker, 2010).  
 
The Coalition’s approach to the governance of transport policy at the sub-national 
level combines the localism agenda with the need to identify strategic priorities within 
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the context of significant reductions in government spending. A key element of the 
reforms on sub-national transport has been the simplification of local transport 
funding by reducing funding streams from 26 to 4 - the Major Schemes Programme, 
Local Highways Maintenance, Integrated Transport Block and Local Sustainable 
Transport Fund (DfT, 2011). The Local Transport White Paper argued that this 
simplification of funding would provide local authorities ‘greater flexibility in how 
they spend their funding, which is crucial if they are to deliver efficient and effective 
transport for their communities at a time of limited resources’ (DfT, 2011: 29-30).  
 
By contrast, the RFA exercises were criticised for placing ‘influence in the hands of 
indirectly elected Regional Assemblies and unelected RDAs’ (DfT, 2010b: 5). 
Instead, new local governance arrangements will be centred on a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach where LEPs and local authorities, working individually or in partnership, 
will play the central role in strategic decision-making. There was, however, 
recognition from DfT that these partnership structures are unlikely to be in place in 
the short term and therefore the department outlined a centrally-managed competitive 
bidding process for transport schemes prioritised by the RFA exercises (DfT, 2010b). 
The extent to which the Coalitions plans are able to combine an emphasis on localism, 
while facilitating strategic transport decision-making processes and economies of 
scale is difficult to assess given the infancy of the plans. Nonetheless, there are 
significant doubts about the ability of local authorities to coordinate their activities in 
the absence of regional governance structures to facilitate a more joined up response.   
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Past lessons and future prospects?  
 
Our analysis of the RFA process has revealed a number of important lessons that are 
particularly pertinent to the Coalition’s reforms for transport policy in England. These 
include,  
 
 The dangers of ‘excessive localism’,  
 Undermining sub-national governance and decision-making capacity, and 
 Enhanced conflict between tiers of governance.  
 
The following discussion explores these potential pitfalls in light of the Coalition’s 
ongoing reforms and critically assesses what might be lost by the removal of regional 
transport structures and decision making.   
 
i. The dangers of ‘excessive localism’  
 
The RFA exercise encouraged a more collaborative, partnership-based approach to 
identifying strategic regional transport priorities. Transport officials at all governance 
levels agreed that the process had moved beyond the parochialism and political horse-
trading of previous decision-making arrangements towards a more objective, 
evidence-based process. However, there is a potential tension between the Coalition’s 
commitment to localism and the need to develop effective sub-national strategic 
transport planning. Vigar and Stead (2003: 65) note that regional level transport 
planning provided an opportunity to ‘secure agreement over wide areas on more 
strategic priorities and avoid a degree of inter-locality competition, enabling more 
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radical policies to come forward.’ The two RFA exercises highlighted that the 
brokering of regional strategic priorities remained highly challenging for local 
authorities given the pressure to ‘get their pet schemes off the shelf that been lying 
dormant for many years’ (South East Environmental Stakeholder).  
 
Indeed, the need for transport planning on a larger spatial scale has been recognised in 
statements by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport who argued 
that ‘transport is no respecter of local authority boundaries’ and the Department is 
keen to ‘engage with effective partnerships wherever there are strategic issues to be 
considered’ (Baker, 2010). The LEPs or consortiums of LEPs have been identified as 
a potential route for considering wider strategic issues and it is clear that many LEPs 
envisage some form of transport function (SQW, 2010). However, there are concerns 
as to the capacity of the LEPs to fulfil this role. For example, a GO official from the 
East Midlands pointed out that,  
 
‘The worry is that some LEPs are effectively just County LEPs. How is that 
going to work unless they enter into confederations of LEPs and develop a 
bigger geography? But, if that does happen, you call into question whether the 
politicians will buy into that at the end of the day’.  
 
Therefore, the Coalition’s decentralisation agenda risks ‘excessive localism’ 
characterised by self-serving local authorities acting individually (Larkin, 2010). 
Indeed, there is a danger of a return to the parochialism that characterised sub-national 
decision making on transport before the introduction of RFAs. Furthermore, these 
issues highlight a tension between different departments within the Coalition 
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government in terms of how localism and decentralisation are operationalised. A GO 
official from the East of England indicated that there was a ‘real tension’ between the 
communities-orientated ‘localism, localism, localism’ agenda pursued by Eric Pickles 
and DCLG and the DfT agenda which argued that ‘regions are actually quite helpful’. 
These contradictions within Whitehall reflect similar tensions that emerged under the 
previous Labour Government in terms of the regional agenda (Ayres and Stafford, 
2010). While some departments were supportive of decentralisation others were not, 
significantly undermining the cohesiveness of Whitehall’s approach to sub-national 
policy making in England.  
 
ii. Undermining sub-national governance and decision-making capacity 
 
The second key lesson highlighted by the RFA process focuses more narrowly on the 
potential impact of the Coalition’s reforms on decision-making capacity around sub-
national transport planning and policy-making. First, there are question marks as to 
whether LEPs or individual local authorities will have ‘adequate expertise and 
knowledge’ to develop major transport projects (South East GO Official). Second, 
there are potential risks related to maintaining the quality of the evidence base which 
underpinned regional decision making. The institutional repositioning created by the 
reforms could lead to knowledge and evidence being lost or dissipated amongst 
diverse organisations. Regional officials explained that the GOs and RDAs had put in 
place ‘knowledge transfer’ arrangements to ensure that technical information and 
research was retained but that it was ‘inevitable’ that some capacity and data would be 
lost. Finally, the level of resources available to LEPs and local authorities to develop 
transport projects and schemes is likely to be extremely limited. A North East GO 
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official explained that ‘it is a devil of a job to start to develop a major project because 
all of the money that you invest in the early stages is at your own risk’. This concern 
is exacerbated by wider public spending cuts as local authorities struggle to deliver 
core statutory functions at the expense of long term strategic projects. For example, a 
South West Regional Assembly official indicated that their focus was likely to be 
‘making sure that potholes are filled in and not a lot else’.    
 
iii. Enhanced conflict between tiers of governance 
 
The final key lesson which can be drawn from the RFA experience centres on the 
potential impact of the Coalition’s reforms on vertical and horizontal governance 
arrangements. The Coalition’s preference for a ‘hands- off’ role for Whitehall may 
actually signal a move away from the partnership approach characteristic of RFAs and 
could lead to increased conflict between tiers of government as more decisions are 
taken at the Centre with little engagement with the sub-national level. A GO official 
in the East Midlands argued that,  
 
‘What we don’t want to return to is the bad old days where priorities were 
determined nationally and it was he who shouts the loudest gets the cash. We 
had a system developed through RFAs which was much broader, more 
strategic and much more effective. I think that there is some concern that the 
localism agenda might drive things too far down and leave DfT unable to 
determine strategic priorities apart from at the Centre’. 
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In addition, the rationale underpinning localism places an onus on local authorities 
and LEPs to take responsibility and financial liability for decision-making. A DfT 
official pointed out that, 
 
‘There is bound to be a greater level of risk and rewards that get pushed down 
to the local level…if they get it wrong and they spend money on a scheme that 
actually doesn’t do much good for the economy, then I suppose that is where 
the risk lies’.  
 
This process is potentially exacerbated by the abolition of the GOs which provided 
key links between the Centre and sub-national level. Without this intermediary, there 
will be increased fragmentation in sub-national governance arrangements which will 
place greater strain on DfT resources in managing intergovernmental relations at a 
time of budget cuts and reductions in staffing.   
 
The Coalition’s reforms have received varying levels of support from regions and 
localities. Transport officials across many regions, notably the East of England, East 
Midlands and North West, identified a commitment to retain some form of regional 
partnership which could facilitate collaboration and discussions around transport. An 
East of England GO official explained that members of the Regional Transport Forum 
had voted to continue meeting but that it was unlikely that the forum would survive if 
‘there was no money to talk about’. The potential for continued regional collaboration 
was notably least apparent in the South West, where officials from both the former 
South West Leaders Board and GO noted that there was little appetite for regional 
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working and that regional meetings between officials would ‘die fairly quickly’ 
without strong leadership.  
 
Moreover, the constant institutional and political repositioning brought about by 
Coalition reforms could jeopardise the commitment and engagement of wider social 
and environmental stakeholders. Regional structures and the RFA process emphasised 
the importance of engaging a wide range of social, economic and environmental 
partners in decisions about transport priorities. Practice may not have always met the 
rhetoric but the intention afforded a range of partners a seat at the table. By contrast, 
LEP proposals place the primary focus on business groups with minimal reference to 
engagement with the third sector or environmental groups (House of Commons 
Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, 2010).  
 
Conclusions  
 
This paper has critiqued the opportunities and limitations of New Labour’s attempts to 
promote enhanced sub-national control over transport planning via the RFA process. 
These findings have been utilised to drawn attention to what might be lost as a 
consequence of the Coalition’s reforms. This analysis can be utilised to answer the 
first of the key questions posed at the beginning of this paper (i) What lessons can be 
learned from the RFA process in terms of promoting effective decision making 
procedures for identifying sub-national transport priorities in England? 
 
The RFA exercise was perceived by transport stakeholders at all governance levels to 
deliver significant added value in terms of promoting a more collaborative, strategic 
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approach to sub-national transport planning. Although the process had clear 
weaknesses, it was seen to offer considerable benefits in terms of enhancing inter-
governmental relations, transforming regional ‘wish lists’ into programmes of long-
term strategic priorities and providing a more consensual, transparent and evidence 
based approach to decision-making. The abolition of the GOs, RDAs and Regional 
Leaders Boards has left a substantial institutional vacuum at the sub-national level. It 
is unclear as to whether the plethora of Coalition reforms will be able to establish 
robust partnership arrangements to fill this ‘missing middle’ in English governance 
and build upon the progress made by initiatives like the RFAs (Shaw and Greenhalgh, 
2010). Unless the Coalition provides clear incentives and mechanisms to facilitate 
joint working across localities and between governance tiers there is a very real risk 
that the progress made towards building a strategic and holistic approach to transport 
prioritisation at the sub-national level could be undermined.  
 
The findings presented here also offer insights into the paper’s second question (ii) To 
what extent has the transition from regionalism to localism reflected a genuine 
rescaling of governance arrangements to the local level? Undoubtedly, the Coalition’s 
localism agenda will fundamentally transform governance arrangements for sub-
national transport planning and delivery in England. However, the extent to which this 
transition will result in empowering localities and communities to take territorially 
distinct transport decisions remains unclear. The Coalition has argued that its reforms 
are underpinned by a desire to remove Whitehall involvement in monitoring sub-
national transport planning and delivery at a local level. However, DfT appears to 
have retained a strong controlling and coordinating function, at least for the 
immediate future (DfT, 2010b). On the one hand, the Coalition’s commitment to 
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‘localism’ might be interpreted as a radical departure from the former Labour 
administration’s ‘top-down regionalism’ (Hazell, 2006: 48). While, on the other hand, 
the emphasis placed on economic geographies and city-regions represents a marginal 
departure from previous governance arrangements set out in New Labour plans for 
sub-regional partnerships (Mawson, 2009; Pugalis, 2010). The emerging evidence 
indicates that whilst the rhetoric of ‘localism’ heralds a fundamental rescaling of 
power, in reality accountabilities and funding streams remain firmly in Whitehall. 
 
The Coalition has emphasised that the move to ‘localism’ has received enthusiastic 
support from a wide range of civic and community groups, business leaders, housing 
and planning professionals and local authorities (DCLG, 2011). Nonetheless, 
transport is an area which has benefited from a regional focus and there is a very real 
danger that a more strategic, consensus and evidence based approach to identifying 
sub-national transport priorities could be lost. As one RDA chair observed, the 
perception remains that ‘there is not only a danger of throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater, but there is a danger of throwing the bath out as well’.  In order to mitigate 
these risks, the Coalition government and transport stakeholders must consider past 
lessons in order to avoid the pitfalls identified above. If they do not, there is a danger 
that attempts to enhance sub-national discretion over transport policy could be 
derailed.    
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